Those men of the 105th New York Infantry retreating back into the corn had no way to know that their dead and wounded comrades lying just beyond the deadly Cornfield’s southern fence represented the high-water mark of the Union I Corps’ effort to reach the Dunker Church…

The 105th New York Volunteer Infantry overcame many challenges before organizing to serve the Union cause for three years on 28 March 1862. Created by merging two earlier failed efforts to form regiments, the 105th brought together seven companies from the LeRoy area (A, B, C, D, E, F, and K) and three companies from Rochester (G, H, and I). This division reached to the new regiment’s top when LeRoy’s Reverend James M. Fuller, who bought in the most men, while Rochester’s Howard Carroll become the regiment’s lieutenant colonel.   [1]

Uncertainly had pervaded the regiment’s organization for months because although Fuller’s first volunteer had enlisted on 1 November 1861, by 25 January 1862 only 445 men were living as soldiers in the LeRoy training facility Colonel Fuller had arranged. In three large industrial buildings—named “Camp Upham” to honor the building’s owner, former Senator Alonzo S. Upham—the new volunteers learned infantry drill, to adapt to military life, and to pass the time. Nonetheless, the regiment continued running advertisements in the local newspapers to fill remaining manpower gaps.  [2]

 
Resolving Fuller’s manpower problem only created a new challenge – ethnic divisions. While Colonel Fuller’s companies were a mix of native-born Americans and various immigrants, Carroll’s three companies consisted almost exclusively Irishmen. Ireland-born Carroll had recruited these men as part of his planned “Western Irish Regiment,” intended ultimately to join General Thomas Francis Meagher’s famed Irish Brigade. Trained at Camp Hillhouse, south of Rochester, Carroll’s recruits had signed on to join an Irish unit not the LeRoy one they found themselves on a train to join at the Avon, New York rendezvous and tensions boiled in the cramped train. Within 20 minutes of stepping from the cars, Carroll’s Irishmen were brawling with the “LeRoy Methodists” but once this was out of their system, the tension quickly subsided. Another concern was resolved when the Roman Catholic Irishmen, who feared their Methodist clergyman colonel would impose his denomination on them, discovered that the 105th’s only chaplain was a Baptist, who served only from March to September 1862. The two groups quickly bonded into a cohesive regiment that readied to face rebellious Southerners.  [3]

 

The men were mustered into Federal Service on multiple dates between November 1961 and March 1862, laying groundwork for muster out problems down the road. Regardless, by 27 March 1862 the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser reported that the thousand-man regiment was full and on 4 April the 105th New York boarded trains heading for Washington DC and the seat of war.

 

There the 105th was assigned to Brigadier General Abram Duryee’s brigade, joining the 97th and 104th New York and 107th Pennsylvania regiments in initially guarding various locations in the Washington defenses. Their first taste of campaign life came in May when the 105th and Duryee’s men marched west to Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley in search of Stonewall Jackson’s elusive force there. Colonel Fuller wrote of this time that they moved “over the worst of roads, lying out three of four nights in the most drenching rain” but that most of the men behaved “like veterans.” Challenging as this was, it was but a taste of things to come.  [4]

 
By June, the 105th and Duryee’s Brigade was shifted into Major General John Pope’s newly created Army of Virginia as part of Brigadier General James Rickett’s Division. Not only was the 105th New York now serving with the brigade and division commanders and units they would join in Antietam’s Cornfield, but in these associations the 105th would experience its first battle. At Cedar Mountain on 9 August 1862 the 105th and Ricketts’ Division covered the retreat of Banks’ corps; playing only a supporting role, the 105th New York nonetheless incurred eight wounded men.

 
Posted afterward along the eastern bank of the Rappahannock River near the Virginia village of Waterloo, the 105th and Duryee’s Brigade participated in a series of skirmishes between 22 and 25 August that collectively became known as the First Battle of Rappahannock Station (actions included those at Waterloo Bridge, Lee Springs, Freeman’s Ford, and Sulphur Springs) which cost Pope’s army a few hundred casualties and the 105th a few additional wounded casualties.  [5]

The 105th was led into all these battles by newly minted Colonel Howard Carroll, however, because Colonel Fuller had departed the regiment on 2 August 1962. Why Fuller returned to Western New York remains uncertain. Perhaps he was reassigned to the LeRoy Branch Depot, which he commanded before leading the 105th. Maybe the 54-year-old realized that soldiering was more attractive in concept than in reality for a man of his age or that his temperament was ill-suited to military command. Possibly he simply wished to return to religious life because on 29 April 1863 the Buffalo Evening Post reported that Rev. Fuller, now the presiding elder of the Methodist Episcopal Church’s Buffalo District, would preach at Grace Church. Or maybe something more sinister was behind his sudden departure….  [6]

 
On 22 June 1863 Buffalo’s Evening Courier and Republic reported that Rev. Fuller had been arrested, charged with “issuing improper orders” when serving as Camp Usham’s quartermaster. These charges stemmed from the 18 June arrest of contractor Charles Stone, who implicated Fuller in an alleged scheme to overcharge the government for supplies while the two pocketed the difference. The truth of this matter may never be known—one newspaper implied in an editorial that Stone’s claims were an unjust attack on the reverend—because charges were apparently dropped and the case never when to trial. Regardless, Colonel Howard Carroll now commanded the 105th New York.  [7]

 
Born probably in 1827 in Dublin, Howard Carroll was from a successful, prominent family and descended through his mother from the Earl of Effingham. Studying briefly at Dublin University, Carroll immigrated to the US in 1855 to work as a civil engineer for the New York Central Railroad. With the outbreak of Civil War Howard Carroll sought to serve his new nation and on 17 October 1861 became quartermaster of the New York Light Artillery’s Second Battalion, which was to provide artillery support for Meagher’s Irish Brigade. Seeking his own command, by early 1862 Howard Carroll began recruiting men in Rochester and on 27 March 1862 was appointed the 105th New York’s lieutenant colonel, promoted to colonel on 2 August 1862.  [8]

 
Pulled from its Waterloo post on the Rappahannock River to join General Pope’s search for Stonewall Jackson’s Command, the 105th on 29 August found itself on ground near the previous year’s Battle of Bull Run, posted along the Sudley Road within view of the now-famous Henry House. The following day the 105th and Ricketts’ Division was moved to the far right of the Union position, while General Fitz John Porter’s forces launched their abortive late afternoon attack. Although the 105th and Duryee’s Brigade was spared the worst of Second Bull Run’s fighting, the regiment nonetheless lost 14 killed or mortally wounded. Although the 105th New York men at Manassas had endured their greatest test so far, this was really just preparation for what awaited them once crossing into Maryland.

 
During the 14 September Battle of South Mountain the 105th and Duryee’s Brigade was posted on the far right of the Union position in Turner’s Gap and was spared the worst of the fighting. Reaching the eastern bank of Antietam Creek during the late following afternoon, the 105th men must have enjoyed the down time they spent resting north of the Boonsboro Pike while General McClellan and his corps commanders weighed what to do next. The men probably knew that Lee’s Confederate army was forming across the creek along the ridge running north and south of town and wondered what was coming next – a battle or another march. By late on the 16th they and the rest of Abram Duryee’s brigade had their answer as they headed north/right to cross Antietam’s Upper Bridge. Marching west behind cavalry and the 13th Pennsylvania infantry—the Bucktails”—of Meade’s Division, another question was resolved when skirmishing opened in the fading light. Moving unopposed onto Sam Poffenberger’s farm, the 105th boys lay down under arms for the night, knowing that morning brought battle. Still, they had no idea how prominent a role they would play in that action.

 
Up before dawn, the 105th New York posted on the far left of General Duryee’s brigade line, forming south of Miller’s North Woods. If not distracted by the Confederate artillery fire from Nicodemus Heights, the men peering through the growing light might have been able seen that the grassy field in which they stood the ground dipped in a swale before rising to a tall field full of ripe corn.

 
What they certainly could have seen was General Harsuff’s nearby brigade, also deployed in a battle line and waiting to advance. They might even have seen Christian’s Brigade through the opening between the North and East Woods. That Ricketts’ entire division was formed for battle ahead of the rest of Hooker’s I Corps would have told them they’d drawn the tough task of leading the battle’s opening attack.

 
What the 105th New Yorkers couldn’t yet know was just how badly this carefully-planned assault would unfold because neither Hartsuff’s nor Christian’s Brigades would immediately be joining Duryee’s men. General Hartsuff’s wounding threw his brigade into command confusion that kept it static, while Christian’s Brigade was being dragged into chaos by its commander’s already unfolding mental breakdown. Without knowing it, the 105th New York and Duryee’s men would be the only Union attackers on the left of Hooker’s assault.

 
Alone, the 105th and Duryee’s men marched through Miller’s open field as Rebel artillery rained shells down on them, tearing holes in their lines and ripping apart the lives of those fathers and sons, husbands and brothers whose bodies made those lines. Veterans, the LeRoy and Rochester men had experienced such horrors before and tried as best they could to ignore the sound of the shells and simply dressed down to fill the gaps that appeared when a shell fragment found its mark. Onward they pressed, into a swale so deep it swallowed the North Woods from view of those few who might have looked to the rear. Once at the swale’s base they were briefly hidden from view of Confederate artillery on the Dunker Church ridge, though not from guns on Nicodemus Heights which continued pounding away. Rising from the swale to crest a slight ridge, they once again became targets for S. D. Lee’s Southern gunners by the church.  [9]

 
The Union had an answer to this and soon Thompson’s Battery—advancing with Duryee’s men—deployed behind the infantry. Shortly Matthew’s Battery too came thundering across the field, adding fire from its four ordnance rifles. To support these guns General Duryee pulled out a detachment from the 105th, which remained as Duryee’s men started forward once more. Short of men, Thomson quickly pressed some 105th infantrymen into service as ersatz gunners. The lot of this detachment was unpleasant, being sitting ducks for Confederate shells, but it unknowingly spared them what awaited their comrades who marched rapidly away. Within a few minutes they reached a rail fence and, beyond it, a field tall with corn. They had found D.R. Miller’s Cornfield.  [10]

 
The five minutes here amidst constant shelling must have seemed like an eternity. Shouting orders, Duryee shifted his formation from a column of divisions into a line of battle, reflecting how close they now were to the Rebels. Once completed, 105th New York held the line’s left flank; to their right stretched the 104th and 97th New York, while the 107th Pennsylvania secured Duryee’s right. Every man awaited the order to advance, not least because doing so would put them under the limited cover the corn provided from shelling. The order that came, however, was not “forward,” but instead for all 1,100 men to lie down.  [11]

 
While his men hugged the ground, Thompson’s and Matthew’s batteries lobbed several rounds into the center of the corn. This certainly was intended to flush out any Rebs lurking there unseen—skirmishers or more—ahead of their advance. As shells screamed overhead to begin the process of wrecking D.R. Miller’s cornfield, Duryee ordered “Rise up!” and to a man, they were on their feet in seconds. Each man knew the next order would be “Forward, march!”  [12]

 
It was just after 6:00 in the morning.

 
Marching through the Cornfield, the 105th boys continued enduring Southern artillery. Company G’s Lieutenant Isaac Doolittle recalled that during the advance his men carried their rifles at ‘right shoulder, shift’ when a Confederate solid shot “took a dozen of our bayonets and snapped them like straw, and the pieces flew right and left.” Still, on the 105th New York and their brigade marched.  [13]

 
For the first time in several minutes Duryee’s men could see beyond the thick corn around them. They’d covered 245 yards; though taking only minutes to do, it might have seemed to have taken hours. Soon Minnie balls made their inevitable appearance, tearing like an unwanted hailstorm through plant and flesh alike. While the corn stood and simply absorbed the assault, Duryee’s men continued advancing to resist this fate. Reaching the field’s end, they finally opened fire on the Rebs.  [14]

 
Facing them just beyond the southern end of Miller’s Cornfield were Lawton’s and Trimble’s Brigades, posted facing north were Stonewall Jackson had put them after replacing Hood’s Division late the previous night. Reflecting the South’s already-mounting officer loses and promotions, Lawton’s men were commanded by Georgia’s Colonel Marcellus Douglass, while Colonel James A. Walker now led Trimble’s Brigade. Although it was Douglass who famously directed his men to pick out a row of corn and fire down it when the Yankees appeared, both brigades were certainly anxiously following these orders, waiting…

 
On Duryee’s right the 107th Pennsylvania emerged to see the enemy—Lawton’s brigade—some 230 yards in front of them, scrambling for cover behind the low remains of a dismantled fence. Without orders, the Pennsylvanians dressed their lines and opened fire. On the opposite flank the 105th and 104th New York found the enemy in their front not focused on them, but rather on Federals in the East Woods to their left. The enemy line here angled back a bit, they discovered, offering room for maneuver and the two New York regiments pressed into the opening beyond the corn. Up and over the fence they went, then forward into the clearing, trying all the while to remain connected to the 97th New York on their immediate right and in the center of Duryee’s line. Halting nearly 40 yards from the corn, the New Yorkers opened a withering fire on the Rebs in their front. As firing intensified into one continuous roll of musketry Duryee’s regiments, apparently without specific orders, instantly lay down as a simple survival technique.  [15]

 
Colonel Walker watched his men of Trimble’s Brigade stop the Yankee advance by focusing their fire on the men in their front, hoping to drive them back into the corn or kill them where they stood. Walker’s situation was little better than that of his Union counterpart, Abram Duryee, only a few dozen yards away. His right flank rested in a plowed field north of the Mumma house and units there were taking casualties fast. Something had to change, or his command could be swept away by a single blue wave. Observing two federal regiments appear to pull back from the western edge of the East Woods—the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves moving to align with the 105th New York and the 13th Reserves adjusting to that move—Colonel Walker made a snap decision, probably a move of simple survival for his small brigade. Walker directed his skirmishers forward into the East Woods seeking a safer, more secure position there, while also pushing the 100 men of his 12th Georgia northward across the Smoketown Road to close a regiment-sized gap between his brigade’s left and the right of Lawton’s Brigade. Wheeling left, the Georgians found a low rock ledge, running parallel to the road, upon which to anchor their position. Colonel Walker’s move hadn’t closed the gap but unknowingly had put his men into just the right position at the right time.  [16]

 
The tiny 12th Georgia found their rock ledge an unexpected gift, a strong defensive position placing them directly on the enemy’s flank. Within seconds, the Georgians began pouring an enfilading fire into Duryee’s left flank, the men of the 105th New York, who could do little against this largely concealed target but stand and take it. Seeing their effect, Walker ordered the 21st Georgia and 21st North Carolina to join the 12th at the rock ledge. Soon all three regiments were tearing apart the 105th New York and Duryee’s left flank.  [17]

 
The 105th and 104th New York had barely reached the new position in the open field beyond the corn when they were staggered by Southern fire, which also forestalled Seymour’s 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves’ from extending its right beyond the East Woods to connect with the 105th New York’s left. The right of Lawton’s line and Walker’s three regiments of Trimble’s Brigade at the rock ledge poured in a withering infantry fire which, joined by S. D. Lee’s artillery from the Dunker Church ridge, simply overwhelmed the New Yorkers. Falling back into the relative safety of the corn, they raced to join the rest of their brigade. Bodies of dozens of their dead and wounded comrades and commanders marked their just-failed advance. They couldn’t know it then, but these dead and wounded New Yorkers represented the high-water mark of the I Corps effort to reach the Dunker Church.  [18]

 

 

The 105th New York paid a tremendous price for this achievement. Lieutenant Colonel Howard Carroll fell with a musket ball through his left calf and Major John W. Shedd too took a ball in his leg, passing command of the regiment to Company A’s Captain John C. Whiteside. Lieutenant Charles Buckley’s left leg was shattered by a Rebel artillery round. 53 enlisted men fell outright or were wounded in reaching the advanced spot. So great was the loss that Lieutenant Doolittle—who himself was wounded here—recalled later that only 40 men rallied on the colors after emerging from the Cornfield.  [19]

 
Duryee’s men were fighting well, but how long could they keep this up? The general could clearly see fresh Confederate brigades to his right—Grigsby’s Stonewall Brigade, and others—that could instantly be upon his flank. New gaps appearing in his ranks were no longer being filled; what his thinning line needed—now—were reinforcements – but where were they? He’d passed Hartsuff’s Brigade when moving forward; why had it not appeared as expected? Where was Christian’s Brigade? It had the farthest to march and could be forgiven for being last on the field, but why was there no sign of it? The 105th and Duryee’s command had been here for nearly 30 minutes, fighting almost alone, and when final counts were made at nightfall nearly a third of his brigade would prove to have been lost in this spot. To withdraw signaled failure and dishonor but to remain much longer begged for the death of his brigade. Duryee chose retreat.  [20]

 
The men about-faced and left the field in generally good order, walking rapidly back through the Cornfield which, too, had suffered from this fight. Behind them soon came both Trimble’s and Lawton’s Confederates, pushing gradually northward and for the first of many times this day, retaking the Cornfield.  [21]

 
The weary men of the 105th New York and Duryee’s other regiments might have wondered where the rest of their division had been while they alone faced down the enemy and if so, they soon found the answer as Hartsuff’s Brigade swept past them in plunging deeper into the Cornfield. Though they’d been of no help before, Hartsuff’s Brigade appeared in time to halt the progress of Timble’s Brigade—Lawton’s was similarly stalled by the Iron Brigade on the Cornfield’s western edge—which allowed the 105th New York and Duryee’s other battered men to slip away to safety. But the 105th’s work at Antietam wasn’t finished just yet…

 
For some reason, a portion of the 105th and 104th New York stopped retreating and halted in the very northern end of the Cornfield. Perhaps in the confusion of retreat they’d lost track of General Duryee and the rest of the brigade, which continued on until halting in the relative safety of the North Woods. Regardless why, here some 100 men of the 105th and 104th New York would remain, for now.

 
Meanwhile, within these Rochester and LeRoy men’s’ view the battle raged on. Hartsuff’s advance stopped Lawton’s and Trimble’s Brigade but Stonewall Jackson wasn’t about to give up that easily. Next on the field came General John Bell Hood’s Division, which rapidly deployed across nearly the Cornfield’s entire width before instantly pushing northward and driving away Hartsuff command and Gibbon’s Iron Brigade. Wofford’s Brigade on the left advanced through the Corfield’s western end, while half of Evander Law’s Brigade pushed northward through the Cornfield’s eastern portion. Before long, Law’s unopposed force neared the northern end of the Cornfield.  [22]

 
There, seeing the enemy coming straight at them waited the 100 or so remaining men of the 105th and 104th New York, which quickly opened a brisk fire on the advancing Rebels. Despite their determination, Hays’ larger force easily brushed the Empire State men away toward the North Woods, where the rest of their brigade now waited. For the 105th New York, the Battle of Antietam was finally over, although noon remained hours away.  [23]

 
Regimental returns would show the 105th New York suffered 80 casualties in the half hour they’d endured in The Cornfield. Nine were killed outright—a number that would grow in the coming days as many men succumbed to their injuries—50 wounded, and 21 missing. Lieutenant Colonel Carroll would succumb to his wound after reaching a Washington, DC hospital, as would Lieutenant Buckley after first enduring having his leg amputated. Among the wounded was 25-year-old Private Robert Austin—the author’s cousin—from Company E, who would nonetheless survive the war. Command of the 105th New York passed to Major Shedd upon recovering from his Antietam wound, who would be the regiment’s last colonel. The unharmed survivors of the 105th, too, buried their dead and returned to their military duties. The war, too, labored on and the 105th New York had yet another role to play.

On 13 December 1862, the 105th New York—still part of the I Corps, commanded now by Major General John Reynolds—and its brigade, led by Colonel Adrian Root, took art in the Battle of Fredericksburg. Posted on the Union left, early in the afternoon division chief General John Gibbon ordered Root’s Brigade and the 105th forward to support gains General Meade’s division had secured after advancing through a lightly defended patch of wooded marsh. Advancing on Lane’s Confederates deployed across the railroad line in their front secured an advanced position there, but lacking reinforcements Root’s Brigade was soon driven back. For their effort the 105th New York sacrificed another 78 casualties.  [24]

 
The losses sustained at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Second Manassas had winnowed the 105th New York nearly beyond existence. In March 1963 army organizers finished what the Rebels and constant marching had begun; the 105th New York was dissolved, merged into the 94th New York as that regiment’s Companies F, G, H, I, and K.

 
There may be no more fitting testimony to the 105th New York’s service than that offered by 93rd New York veteran Edson Hoyt, printed in the Brockport Republic on 7 May 1863: “The old 105th New York has won no great name, but it has seen as hard service as any regiment…and lost nearly as many men in battle. Their torn and battle stained flag is now in LeRoy and speaks for itself. They were a noble band who followed it out, and the few who yet remain are unflinching, true and brave.” And perhaps the hardest service the 105th New York had been called upon to offer during its valiant, short existence was that single half hour it spent in Antietam’s deadly Cornfield.  [25]

 

Colonel Howard Carroll’s Final Resting Place

Endnotes:

[1]  Andrews, William G. Civil War Brockport: A Canal Town and the Union Army (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2013), Chapter 16. The companies were recruited principally: A at Wyoming; B at Lockport; C at Holley; D at LeRoy; E at Batavia; F at Brockport; G, H and I—Irish Brigade; Western Irish Regiment—at Rochester; and K at Yorkshire, Farmersville and LeRoy.
[2]  Ibid.
[3]  Marcotte, Robert Where They Fell: Stories of Rochester Area Soldiers in the Civil War (Franklin, Virginia: Q Publishing, 2002), p. 78; Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, New York, 21 November 2011.
[4]   Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, Buffalo, New York, 27 March 1862; Marcotte Where They Fell, p. 79.
[5]  Phisterer, Frederick New York in the War of the Rebellion, 3rd ed. (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1912).
[6]  Buffalo Evening Post, Buffalo, New York, 29 April 1863.
[7]  Evening Courier and Republic, Buffalo New York, 22 June 1863; Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, Buffalo, New York, 22 June 1863; The Advocate, Buffalo, New York, 9 October 1862, 25 June 1863. Two 14 August 1862 letters to Fuller, reprinted in Buffalo’s The Advocate on 9 October 1862 offer conflicting explanations. General Duryee’s highly complementary letter suggests a personal or religious motive, while another, similarly laudatory letter signed by the 105th’s officers hints at more troubling reasons, opening “Refraining to advert to the circumstance which may have led to your resignation…”
[8]  Hunt, Roger D. Colonels in Blue: Union Army Colonels of the Civil War – New York (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2003), p. 67; “Irish Colonels: Howard Carroll, 105th New York Infantry,” https://irishamericancivilwar.com/2011/05/15/irish-colonels-howard-carroll-105th-new-york-infantry/
[9]  Carman, Ezra A. and Joseph Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign of 1862; Ezra A. Carman’s Definitive Study of the Union and Confederates at Antietam (New York: Routledge Books, 2008), p. 217; Carman, Ezra A. and Thomas G. Clemens. The Maryland Campaign of 1862, Volume II: Antietam (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012), pp. 57-61. Because of army politics and other reasons, Duryee never submitted an Official Report for his brigade’s actions at Antietam (what he did submit was merely a list of officers and men who “behaved with gallantry,” found in OR, Vol. XIX, Pt. 1, pp. 259-260.). However, it is clear from notes and commentary included in Carman’s Antietam manuscript that Duryee provided a detailed account of his command’s actions to Carman, suggesting his version probably accurately reflects the brigade’s movements and actions.
[10]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 217; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp. 57-61; Richard A. Sauers and Peter Tomasak, Ricketts’ Battery: A History of Battery F, 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery (Published by Luzerne National Bank, PA, 2001), p. 52.
[11]  The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XIX, Parts 1 and 2. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887 (Hereafter OR), p. 262; Franklin Benjamin Hough, History of Duryee’s Brigade, During the Campaign in Virginia under Gen. Pope, and in Maryland Under Gen. McClellan, and in the Summer and Autumn of 1862 (Albany), 1864., p. 118.
[12]  Hough, History of Duryee’s Brigade, p. 119; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, p. 58. Carman’s account is the only record suggesting Union artillery shelled the cornfield before Duryee’s troops entered. Although Carman specifically refers to “canister,” more likely he means “case shot,” an anti-personnel round with the range to reach the field which canister rounds lack.
[13]  Rochester Public Library, Isaac Doolittle Letters; Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, New York, 6 August 2001.
[14]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 217; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp. 57-61.
[15]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 217; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp. 57-61.
[16]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 217; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp. 57-61; OR, Vol. XIX, Pt. 1, pp. 976-977.
[17]  OR, Vol. XIX, Pt. 1, pp. 976-977.
[18]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 217; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp. 57-61.
[19]  Rochester Public Library, Isaac Doolittle Letters; Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, New York, 6 August 2001; Joseph Hooker military papers, 1861-1864, Box 9, Huntington Library, San Marino, California, 167-168.
[20]  John C. Delaney letter to E.A. Carmen, 27 March 1891, Antietam National Battlefield; Lieutenant Colonel L. C. Skinner (104th New York) map to E.A. Carman, 24 March 1895, Antietam National Battlefield; Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 218; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp. 61-63. In contributing to Carman’s history of the battle, Duryee claimed he was told that elements of Seymour’s Brigade—the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves and skirmishers of the 1st and 6th Reserves—were being driven back by Confederate troops, who were then flooding into the East Woods, threatening his flank and forcing him to retreat. Because there’s no proof that Walker’s attack by Trimble’s Brigade ever entered the East Woods, the claim that an “intelligence failure” prompted his retreat seems to be little more than a convenient excuse for ordering retreat. I believe that, more likely, the condition of his brigade after half an hour of intense fighting and significant casualties had taken their toll, forcing retreat as the only option to death.
[21]  OR, Vol. XIX, Pt. 1, p. 977; Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 218; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp.61-63.
[22]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 229; Carman and Clemens, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, Vol. II, pp.99-103.
[23]  Carman and Pierro, Ed. The Maryland Campaign, p. 229; Sauers Ricketts’ Battery: A History, p. 53.
[24]  Marcotte Where They Fell, pp. 91-92.
[25]  Brockport Republic, Brockport, New York, 7 May 1863; Marcotte Where They Fell, p. 80.